Ibrahim Mbaye and the evolving Aston Villa attack

Aston Villa have reached an agreement in principle for Ibrahim Mbaye, an 18-year-old winger developed inside Luis Enrique’s Paris Saint-Germain. His age makes the transfer look like another investment in the future, but his profile says rather more about the present: Villa are assembling an attack capable of stretching the pitch, accelerating earlier and reaching goal through several different routes.

By Nico Valenti

Ibrahim Mbaye is an interesting player to spend close to £50 million on because Aston Villa are not especially short of young attackers. Alejandro Garnacho has already arrived to play from the left, Johan Manzambi can operate between midfield and attack, Brian Madjo has pushed himself towards Unai Emery’s first-team plans and Nicolas Jackson is expected to become the new reference at centre-forward following Ollie Watkins’ departure.

The agreement in principle with Paris Saint-Germain, reportedly worth around €55 million, therefore looks less like recruitment for an empty position and more like another piece of a fairly substantial redesign. Mbaye is only 18, but he has already played 42 times for PSG’s senior side, become their youngest-ever starter, accumulated Champions League experience and broken into Senegal’s senior team. Villa are buying potential, certainly, but not the distant variety that spends its first season waiting for adulthood. If the remaining details are completed as expected, Emery is getting a player he can begin using immediately.

What makes the move particularly revealing is the type of winger Villa have chosen. Mbaye is right-footed and has played from both sides, but much of his best senior football has come from the right, where he is comfortable staying outside rather than treating the touchline merely as a starting point for a run infield. There is something almost traditional about the picture. He receives wide, gets his body pointing towards the opposition goal and wants the next action to happen quickly: attack the full-back, reach the space behind him or play the ball across the penalty area. On the left he has shown a little more variation, including an excellent two-assist performance against Metz last season, but even there he does not automatically become a narrow playmaker. Luis Enrique asked his wide players to stretch the opposition, press with intensity and attack the spaces that appeared once PSG had moved defenders around; Mbaye grew from a teenager being given occasional minutes into somebody increasingly trusted to perform those responsibilities.

That gives Villa something they have not consistently possessed. Emery’s best sides at Villa have often attacked from positions that look narrow before expanding late. The No 10s come inside, the forwards move through the channels and the full-backs are responsible for deciding when the pitch needs widening. It has produced some wonderful football, but it can also create games where too many Villa players are looking for the same central spaces. Mbaye offers the possibility of starting with the width already established. The opposition full-back cannot squeeze towards midfield because there is an attacker standing outside him who is quick enough to make the space behind immediately dangerous. The centre-back cannot slide across too early for the same reason. Before Mbaye has dribbled past anybody, he has altered the dimensions in which the rest of the attack operates.

Speed is the obvious quality, but perhaps not the most interesting one. Mbaye can accelerate rapidly once the ball has been pushed beyond his opponent and looks particularly dangerous when receiving into open grass, yet the more useful question for Emery is what that speed does to the people around him. A defence confronting Garnacho, Jackson and Mbaye cannot easily compress both horizontally and vertically. Stay narrow and the wingers have the outside. Move the full-backs towards them and Jackson gets more room between centre-back and full-back. Hold a high line and all three possess the pace to attack what sits behind it. Retreat and Manzambi, Goretzka and the midfield gain space from which to play. Villa have spent several seasons becoming extremely good at manipulating a defensive shape through possession; their summer recruitment suggests they increasingly want to be able to punish the shape once it moves.

Width without waiting for the full-back

The relationship on Villa’s right could be one of the clearest examples. Aaron Wan-Bissaka and Matty Cash offer Emery two rather different ways of supporting the same winger, and Mbaye’s ability to remain wide means neither full-back has to perform the same job every week.

Wan-Bissaka can stay deeper while Mbaye holds the touchline ahead of him. Villa could then allow Ruggeri or Maatsen to advance much more aggressively from the opposite side, producing the sort of asymmetric back line Emery has increasingly been assembling. In possession, Wan-Bissaka can become part of a three-man defensive platform while Mbaye supplies the right-sided width himself. Ruggeri can underlap Garnacho on the left, Manzambi or Goretzka can occupy one of the half-spaces and the striker remains central. What began as a conventional back four can settle into something resembling a 3-2-5 without Villa needing Wan-Bissaka to pretend he is an attacking wing-back.

There is a defensive benefit buried inside that attacking arrangement. Mbaye has been developed in a PSG side where the winger’s work does not finish once possession is lost. Ligue 1’s own assessment of his development highlighted increasingly aggressive pressing alongside his ability to hold width and penetrate from outside. Wan-Bissaka behind him should also allow Emery to be selective about how deeply Mbaye has to retreat. Against certain opponents, Villa can leave the teenager higher and trust Wan-Bissaka to manage the first duel if possession breaks down, creating an immediate outlet once the ball is recovered. That would make the right side less about the full-back overlapping and more about a defender enabling the winger to remain dangerous.

Cash changes the relationship. His instinct is to advance, and if Mbaye moves temporarily into the right half-space, Cash has the running capacity to take over the outside lane. Mbaye has shown enough positional flexibility at PSG to make that plausible rather than theoretical. He can begin wide, move horizontally towards the striker and attack the gap between centre-back and full-back, especially when another player has occupied the defender outside. A Villa right side featuring Cash and Mbaye could therefore become more rotational than one involving Wan-Bissaka: sometimes the winger provides the width, sometimes the full-back does, with the uncertainty itself becoming part of the problem for the opposition.

Mbaye’s recent goal against Manchester United offered a small example of why describing him only as a touchline winger would undersell him. PSG constructed the move from deep, worked the ball down their left and eventually found Dro Fernández inside the penalty area. Mbaye had moved from his wider starting position into the centre and arrived six yards from goal to finish the cross. Later in the same game, he was released down the right and drove towards the box for another effort. The two actions belonged to the same player: one occupying the scoring space after the attack developed elsewhere, the other using his pace to become the attack himself.

Garnacho offers a useful contrast on the other side. Both are young, quick and naturally aggressive with the ball, but Villa have not brought in mirror images. Garnacho’s attraction from the left lies partly in the possibility of moving infield onto his right foot and becoming a direct goal threat. Mbaye, when used on the right, is more comfortable allowing the attack to remain outside for longer. That difference could make Villa considerably harder to funnel into predictable areas. Opponents cannot rely on showing both wingers towards the touchline or both towards the middle because each side is capable of producing a different next action.

It also leaves space for the full-backs to behave differently. Ruggeri’s underlapping movements can work inside Garnacho while Mbaye holds width on the opposite side. Maatsen could move into midfield rather than overlapping at all. Wan-Bissaka could stay with the centre-backs. Cash could advance. Emery does not need two full-backs and two wingers repeating the same patterns on opposite sides of the pitch; he can build the five attacking lanes from different starting positions according to the opponent.

That may become one of the defining features of the rebuilt team. Villa are accumulating players who can exchange positions without requiring every attack to become fluid for the sake of it. The important spaces remain relatively fixed — outside lane, half-space, centre — but the players occupying them can change. Mbaye gives Emery somebody naturally comfortable with one of the spaces Villa previously had to manufacture through movement.

A front line that wants the game to move

The Jackson connection may be even more significant. Villa are putting together a centre-forward and two wingers whose natural instincts all point towards the opposition goal. Jackson likes attacking channels and carrying transitions himself. Garnacho wants to receive and accelerate. Mbaye has been most dangerous when space appears in front of him and has already shown the capacity to make runs away from the ball rather than simply asking for it to feet. The overall effect could be a much quicker attacking line than the one Emery inherited.

That does not necessarily mean Villa become a counter-attacking team. Emery has always valued control too much for the distinction to be so crude. The change may instead be in how rapidly control can be converted into penetration. Villa can still circulate possession, draw an opponent forward and wait for the structure they want; once it appears, however, the new group contains more players capable of attacking it immediately.

Zion Suzuki fits into that picture from fifty yards away. His long distribution means a successful press against Villa’s first phase does not guarantee the opponent has won the situation. If the opposition sends five players forward, Suzuki can play beyond them. Jackson can attack the channel, Mbaye can sprint outside him and Garnacho can threaten the opposite side. Even when the pass does not create a chance directly, the knowledge that it can happen changes how confidently an opponent commits to the press.

João Gomes offers the same idea from midfield. His value in regaining possession does not end when the tackle is made. A turnover collected by Gomes while the opposition midfield is facing the wrong way creates precisely the kind of picture Mbaye enjoys. The first pass does not need to travel through four elaborate combinations. Find the winger early and the attack can already be running towards a defensive line that has not recovered.

Manzambi gives Villa another way to reach the same moment. He can receive beyond pressure and carry the ball himself, which should occasionally remove the need for Mbaye to come towards possession. If the winger stays outside while Manzambi breaks through the centre, the full-back faces an unpleasant choice: move in to confront the ball-carrier and release Mbaye, or stay with Mbaye and allow Manzambi to keep advancing. The two young signings are therefore complementary in a way that goes beyond both being quick or technically gifted. One can make the pitch wider while the other travels through its middle.

Goretzka adds the part that can easily be forgotten when discussing a faster team. Somebody still has to arrive after the speed has created the opening. A move involving Mbaye or Garnacho reaching the byline at pace needs a midfielder capable of recognising where the cut-back is likely to land. Goretzka has spent much of his career making precisely that delayed run. Villa could suddenly have more attacks in which the winger, striker and opposite winger reach the penalty area before the midfield does; the German’s timing gives Emery a player capable of joining the move without needing to start it.

The result may be a team less reliant on a conventional No 10. Villa have often used the 4-2-3-1 as their starting reference under Emery, but the new personnel make a more genuine 4-3-3 easier to imagine. Kamara could sit beneath two midfielders, with Manzambi and Goretzka moving ahead of him, while Garnacho and Mbaye provide the width around Jackson. The same group could become a 4-2-3-1 simply by pushing Manzambi higher, or settle into a 3-2-5 once one full-back advances and the other remains.

The distinction between those formations may matter less than it appears. Emery’s teams have always changed shape once possession settles. What feels different now is the location of the width and the speed available once the ball reaches it. In previous versions of Villa, the full-back often had to arrive outside before the winger could move inside. With Mbaye, Emery can begin with the winger already outside and choose what the full-back does afterwards.

There are also more aggressive possibilities. Against a deep block, Villa could effectively form a front four with Garnacho, Jackson, Mbaye and another attacking midfielder, leaving two midfielders beneath them and one full-back joining selectively. Against a high press, both wingers can remain higher and narrower around Jackson to provide immediate targets beyond the first line. Mbaye’s versatility between the two flanks gives Emery scope to alter those arrangements without substituting him, particularly if Garnacho is struggling against a particular full-back or the match begins to open on the opposite side.

None of this should turn an 18-year-old into the tactical centre of the rebuild. Mbaye’s senior numbers remain those of a player at the beginning of his career rather than an established elite winger. He scored three times and assisted twice in 997 Ligue 1 minutes last season, and reports around his development still identify decision-making and the variety of his one-on-one play as areas with room to improve. PSG carefully managed his minutes even after he began forcing his way into Luis Enrique’s rotation. Villa would be buying a player capable of contributing now, not one who should be judged as a £47 million finished product in September.

That may shape Emery’s early use of him. There will be obvious starts against opponents who leave space behind their full-backs, but Mbaye may initially be even more dangerous entering games after an hour. A defender who has spent sixty minutes dealing with one kind of winger suddenly confronting Mbaye’s acceleration is a useful problem to have on the bench. The reverse will also apply: if Mbaye begins the game and the opposition are forced backwards by his pace, Emery can later introduce a player more comfortable receiving in congested areas once the match has changed.

The £55 million agreement suggests Villa see far more than a specialist substitute, though. Liverpool’s interest and PSG’s reluctance to lose him cheaply underline the level at which his potential is regarded, while his exposure to Luis Enrique’s football gives Villa a teenager already accustomed to positional demands more complicated than simply “stay wide and dribble”. He has had to press, rotate, attack the box and recognise when the winger’s best contribution is the space he creates for somebody else.

Perhaps that is why the Mbaye deal says more about Villa than another exciting young signing ordinarily would. Gomes, Manzambi, Garnacho, Jackson and Mbaye point towards a side with considerably more capacity to accelerate than the team Emery inherited. Ruggeri, Maatsen, Cash and Wan-Bissaka give him different ways to support that speed without committing both full-backs in the same manner. It is Emery’s structure, but with the new capability of releasing something faster.

Villa have spent several years learning how to control where a game is played. The next version may be increasingly interested in what happens immediately after they have succeeded.